Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: Does Partners' Vulnerability Matter?

Giuseppe Attanasi (1) , Claire Rimbaud (2) , Marie Villeval (3, 4)

1 UNIROMA - Università degli Studi di Roma "La Sapienza" = Sapienza University [Rome]
2 Leopold Franzens Universität Innsbruck - University of Innsbruck
3 CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
4 IZA - Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit - Institute of Labor Economics

We investigate whether a player's guilt aversion is modulated by the co-players' vulnerability or whether it is only activated by the willingness to avoid disappointing them. We also explore whether the nature of vulnerability (ex-post vs. ex-ante) matters. Ex-post vulnerability arises when a player's material payoff depends on another player's action (e.g., recipients in a dictator games). Ex-ante vulnerability arises when her initial endowment can be entrusted to another player (e.g., trustors in trust games). Treatments vary whether trustees can condition their decision on the belief of another player who is ex-post and/or ex-ante vulnerable. We find that trustees' guilt aversion is insensitive to the nature of the co-player's vulnerability and to the role of the co-player. Guilt is activated even absent vulnerability of co-players. It is mainly triggered by the willingness to respond to others' expectations, regardless of their responsibility or the kindness of their intentions.

Mots clés: Guilt Aversion; Vulnerability; Psychological Game Theory; Trust Game; Experiment

Domaines: Economies et finances

Giuseppe Attanasi, Claire Rimbaud, Marie Villeval. Guilt Aversion in (New) Games: Does Partners' Vulnerability Matter?. 2022. ⟨halshs-03620418v1⟩